Repeating games and dynamical systems in oil market

   We use the modern theory of repetitive games in a model that help understand a market with a cartel like OPEP. We also study a dynamical system Lotka-Volterra type, and we analyze the dynamic behavior of the model.

Main Authors: Acuña Ortega, Osvaldo, Ulate Montero, Fernán
Format: Artículo
Language: Español
Published: 2015
Online Access: http://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/matematica/article/view/314
http://hdl.handle.net/10669/12972
Summary:    We use the modern theory of repetitive games in a model that help understand a market with a cartel like OPEP. We also study a dynamical system Lotka-Volterra type, and we analyze the dynamic behavior of the model.